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Abstract
Numerous contemporary philosophers have invoked the idea
that art is best understood as a social practice in order to
distinguish among art kinds or to distinguish Art from closely
related practices such as Design. Many general accounts of
social practices and of art practices in particular claim that sets
of shared assumptions or norms are a key constituent of
practices. But some standard accounts of social practices
interpret these shared norms with the concept of “rules” or
“agreements.” I argue that the idea of rules or agreements is
theoretically inadequate and should be replaced by what the
philosopher of science, Joseph Rouse, calls “mutual normative
accountability.” I then illustrate the theoretical value of such a
replacement by discussing the di erences between Art practices
and Design practices.
Key Words
agreements; art; design; ne art; mutual accountability; norms;
practices; roles; routes of circulation; rules
1. Practices and the “pragmatic constraint”
I have been encouraged to consider a practice approach to
distinguishing art kinds by the way Amie Thomasson, Sherri
Irvin, Noel Carroll, Gary Iseminger, Peter Lamarque, and David
Davies, have each in their di erent ways developed positions in
the ontology of art that treat practices as a “pragmatic
constraint” on theorizing.[1] More recently, both Nicholas
Wolterstor and Dominic Lopes have developed accounts of art
practices, and Lopes has o ered a persuasive account? of
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aesthetic practices.[2] Given the widespread invocation of the
concept of social practices in aesthetics today, it would still seem
worthwhile to address some theoretical issues surrounding
practices.[3] As an exploratory venture, this paper will focus on a
critique of the idea that “rules” or “agreements” are a crucial
element in the shared assumptions identifying practices.
2. Terminological ambiguities
Before proceeding, I need to address a couple of terminological
ambiguities. First, what some writers call “practices” others call
“institutions,” as in George Dickie’s “institutional” de nition of art
or in John Searle’s in uential social ontology.[4] In this paper, I
distinguish between practices and institutions, treating
institutions as one aspect of the larger set of activities and
relations that constitute an identi able social practice.[5]
A second terminological problem arises from the fact that some
social scientists and philosophers have used “art world” for what
others call art practices.[6] Even Gary Iseminger’s book, The
Aesthetic Function of Art, which has a very helpful discussion of
the “practice of art,” ends up making practice interchangeable
with the idea of the “art world” as an informal institution.[7] In
this paper, I will use “practice” throughout to avoid confusion
with institutional de nition projects, and to emphasize social
ontology rather than the empirical study of institutions,
although the results of the empirical sciences are important to a
fully adequate theoretical account as Dominic Lopes has argued.
[8]
3. Some elements of social practices
A practice approach, as I see it, would focus on the network of
relations within which works or performances are constituted as
arts of one kind or another. What sorts of things make up these
“networks of relations”? Here are just a few elements often
referenced in general discussions of social practices,
1) Shared, but contested, assumption or rules, and
2) Shared, but contested, histories, which inform patterns of
activities such as
3) typical roles and their behaviors as well as
4) typical routes of circulation and their institutions
Of course, the above list of elements is not meant to be
exhaustive and I have used “typical” and “contested” to stress
that most social practices are a matter of ongoing constitution in
which the participants are constantly interacting with each other
concerning both the ends and means of the practice, including
which parts of its history are most relevant. Moreover, if we
were to look at art or aesthetic practices in particular, other
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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elements such as intention and media would come into play.
This paper will consider primarily the place of shared
assumptions, rules and norms.
4. Stability, identity and rules
Given the multi-faceted character of art practices, and the
frequent emergence of new practices, do named practices like
ne arts or design arts have enough stability to make the
concept of practice useful for analysis? Among philosophers, the
primary way of explicating the coherence of practices has
traditionally been by way of an analysis of their shared
assumptions articulated as rules, which are often conceived on
an analogy with formal games.[9] In what follows, I will propose
that reconceiving the idea of shared assumptions as mutually
accountable norms of action might give us a more useful
practice concept in general and for the arts and aesthetic
experience in particular.
A. Rule-based accounts of practices
The problem with rules, as Wittgenstein argued, is that their
application can lead to an endless regress of interpretations. Yet
Wittgenstein believed there is “a way of grasping a rule which is
not an interpretation, but is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying
the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases.”[10] Later, he says
that if he has exhausted attempts to justify an action, “I have
reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to
say, ‘This is simply what I do.'”[11]
Recent approaches to practices as rule-governed follow
Wittgenstein to the extent of emphasizing constitutive rather
than regulative rules. The most in uential account comes from
John Searle, who claims that we can codify the rules that
“constitute” or make social institutions possible.[12] Like chess
or baseball, he argues, institutional facts such as money only
exist so long as people continue to accept them as constituted.
Searle grants that most people will not be conscious of the
actual rules underlying practices, but claims that humans have
evolved a “set of dispositions that are sensitive to the rule
structure.”[13]
Despite the many virtues of Searle’s account, his way of
explicating rules by analogy with games like chess and baseball
obscures the dynamic nature of many social practices. Formal
games have codi ed rules and xed boundaries. But many
social practices not only overlap neighboring ones, but are more
like the spontaneous games children devise where the “rules”
are often invented on the spot and subject to revision as one or
another player calls out some new twist. Searle believes that all
such informal social practices, even “friendship, dates, cocktail
parties” could be codi ed, even though codi cation, he admits
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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,would deprive us of “ exibility, spontaneity and informality.”[14]
This admission underlines a major problem with his “structure
of rules” account of practices; it suggests a static view of
patterns of activity, whereas many practices are constantly
undergoing varying rates of change.
B. Dialogical approaches to practices
Both Peter Lamarque, re ecting on literary practices, and Joseph
Rouse, re ecting on scienti c practices, distance themselves
from the primacy of rules, although Lamarque clings to a form
of the rules approach that he calls “agreements.” Lamarque’s
careful exegesis of Wittgenstein’s views on practices and rules
leads him to say: “there is more to a practice than being
constituted by rules and it is more illuminating to think of
conforming to a practice as engaging in activities of a certain
kind . . . than merely to emphasize” the rules.[15] But Lamarque
goes on to say that “agreement in action” is not separable from
rules, and in fact that “there has to be a bedrock of agreement
for there to be any kind of stability” to a practice.[16] Literary
practice, for example, requires agreement on a canon and on
reading in terms of form, style, and theme.[17] Although
Lamarque’s account of the place of rules is suppler than
Searle’s, by insisting on a “bedrock of agreement,” Lamarque’s
account still tends to minimize the importance of the ongoing
debates and innovations that are part of artistic practices.[18]
I believe Joseph Rouse’s discussion of scienti c practices o ers a
way to better articulate how practices can be both open and yet
relatively stable. Rouse argues that we should not look for some
pre-existing, underlying agreement on the nature of science, but
see the practices of science as held together by what he calls
their “mutual normative accountability,” an accountability which
is expressed in the way individual scienti c performances “bear
on one another” in a “network of mutual interaction.”[19] Thus,
each move in developing a scienti c theory or designing an
experiment is accountable to other participants in the practice,
who will repeat, translate, infer, correct, refute, or con rm it. As
a consequence, science’s “patterns of interaction” are temporal
through and through since mutual accountability also includes
past participants. Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion of ethics in
After Virtue also stresses that the continuity and identity of
many practices is de ned in part through the struggles that
make up the history of that practice.[20] Like MacIntyre, Rouse
claims that the interaction with other performances within a
practice only becomes normative when it occurs “in a way that
can be understood to be for the sake of something at stake in
the interaction.”[21]
But that means the mutual accountability is equally directed to
the future since the aims and issues for the sake of which the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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participants are interacting are never nally decided and no one
perspective on a practice is “privileged in advance.”[22]
Accordingly, unlike Searle, who tends to reduce norms to rules,
Rouse contrasts “norms,” understood as mutual accountability
in action, with the idea of “rules” when they are conceived as
xed and pre-existing agreements. Rouse concludes that the
coherence of scienti c practices is determined by the “mutual
accountability of constituent performances to issues . . . whose
resolution is always prospective.”[23]
5. Application to distinguishing design arts from ne arts
I believe the general form of Rouse’s account of the normativity
of scienti c practices can illuminate how art practices, which are
constantly subject to debate and change, can nevertheless have
an “always prospective” identity. Trying to guarantee stability
through “rules,” or “agreements,” on the other hand, can easily
lead us to underplay the major advantage of a practice
approach, namely, its concern with patterns of activities. Here, it
is worth remembering that the “bedrock” Wittgenstein speaks of
hitting with his shovel is not a set of rules or agreements, but
“simply what I do.”[24] In a practice approach to art kinds, then,
it will be at least as important to understand the roles,
behaviors, routes of circulation, and other activities that
constitute a practice, as it will to articulate a set of shared
assumptions believed to be implicit in the practice as a whole.
I now want to test such a reliance on “mutual accountability”
rather than “rules” or “agreements” in our understanding of art
practices by attempting to disentangle some issues raised by
current claims that such instances of design as fashion or
perfume should be treated as ne art (rather than design art).
The curator, Zoë Ryan, has claimed that the conceptual
approach of the fashion designers whose works she exhibited at
the Art Institute of Chicago in 2012 is “elevating” their designs to
“the status of ne art.”[25] Another curator, Chandler Burr,
exhibited a dozen commercial perfumes at the Museum of Arts
& Design in New York in 2013, claiming that perfumes are
“actually works of art, equal . . . to painting, sculpture, music,
architecture, and lm.”[26] Some critics have responded
enthusiastically to such claims with talk of “blurred boundaries”
and “border crossings.” But I believe we need a more nuanced
theoretical account of the relation of Art and Design. Art status
claims like Ryan’s or Burr’s raise the question of whether there
are theoretical grounds for distinguishing between Art and
Design as practices constituted not by xed rules or
agreements, but by always prospective norms based on mutual
accountability.
First, I need to make a methodological clari cation. In brie y
contrasting Art and Design practices in the next paragraphs I will
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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focus on ne art and design art as umbrella categories, although
one might apply a practice analysis to various sub-categories
within either set, for example, to product, fashion or graphic
design. Second, we need to keep in mind that the term “design”
is often used in a verbal sense to designate a process common
to all sorts of practices, including the ne arts, whereas I will be
considering the concepts of “design” and “ ne art” as referring
to named sets of social practices or professions.[27]
I will consider only two norms of action in typical design
practices and ne art practice, the norms re ected in roles and
in routes of circulation. If we look at the normative role involved
in the activity of designing, it is clear that designers’ actions are
constrained by the practical needs and desires of users. In the
activity of ne artists, by contrast, attending to practical
constraints is purely optional, since the norms of contemporary
artistic practice permit artists to perform, use, make, or
commission, anything, in any way, for any reason. As for the
recipients of designed objects, their roles typically involve using
or consuming them, though often with a concern for aesthetic
as well as practical satisfaction. The roles of audiences for the
visual ne arts, by contrast, have become as variable as the
freedom of contemporary artists, who now solicit from
audiences many forms of cognitive and a ective engagement,
including participation in bringing works into being.
Turning to routes of circulation, designers obviously circulate
their creations through standard commercial channels, reviews
in design, product or lifestyle publications, and occasionally their
works may end up in design galleries or a special section of art
museums. Although most ne art works typically circulate
through art exhibitions, art galleries, art museums, and
periodicals, there is a long history of trying to get art and life
back together through installations, performances, and events
outside traditional venues, although such works usually end up
circulating through images in ne art venues, including artidenti ed electronic media.
Yet, in apparent contravention of these normative roles and
routes, individual artists or designers may temporarily assume
one another’s roles. Some designers and architects have created
paintings or sculptures and certain works of contemporary
fashion, product or architectural design are themselves highly
sculptural and sometimes quite impractical as well, so that some
design works do seem to straddle the boundary between design
and art. From the side of contemporary art practice, artists
sometimes shift into the role of designers by accepting the
constraints of practicality as in Andrea Zittel’s series of living
units.[28] As for overlapping routes of circulation, one of the
things that got me thinking about the issue of rules in practices,
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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was the way some art curators take instances of fashion or
perfume design out of their normal patterns of circulation and
insert them into ne art circuits.
Yet, to more fully understand these intersecting roles and
routes, we also need to consider the intertwined histories of art
and design. When the category of Fine Art rst emerged in the
18th century, most theorists included architecture in its core
extension, but often excluded the applied or decorative arts. In
the 19th century, this exclusion was reinforced by the creation
of separate museums for the applied or decorative arts in
Europe, and separate departments for decorative arts within
American museums, sometime renamed departments of design
in the early 20th century. Thus, until the early twentieth century
architectural design was considered a ne art whereas the
applied arts or design art sub-disciplines were usually given a
subordinate position.
What has changed over the last half century is the expansion of
the old disciplinary list of the visual ne arts, originally centered
on painting, sculpture and architecture, then opened to
photography and lm, and now to conceptual, installation,
performance, and participatory practices and numerous
mixtures. In this post-disciplinary atmosphere, in which anything
can become a vehicle for art, the fact that designers and artists
can switch roles and curators can manipulate routes of
circulation is the kernel of truth in the claims that the
boundaries between Art and Design have blurred.
Even so, the existence of boundary crossings and borderline or
hybrid works does not excuse us from thinking through the
normative di erences that still exist among practices. By
focusing on networks of mutually accountable norms of action
that constitute practices, we can account for the existence of
cross border tra c and so-called “blurred boundaries,” but at
the same time show that producers and receivers within each
practice act in di erent, if sometimes exchangeable roles,
circulate works along di erent, if sometimes intersecting,
routes, and reference di erent, if intertwined, histories. In sum,
the practice approach I am exploring distinguishes among art
kinds by analyzing the normative patterns of activities and
histories (rather than “rules”) that give a prospective identity to
various art kinds.
That said, there are several objections one might raise, as well
as further issues that need to be addressed. I will brie y
mention and comment on two objections and three issues.
6. Objections and issues
Objections:
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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1) Can a practice approach avoid circularity? Yes, since even
though the same kind terms may be used as a modi er for
several practice elements, the latter form a network of distinct
activities that could be described in other terms.[29]
2) Are practice approaches inherently conservative as Richard
Shusterman claims? Not unless we think of practices as
constituted by static rules. As indicated above, any
characterization of a practice is itself an intervention in the
process of mutual accountability that constitutes norms.[30]
Such interventions may have a conservative e ect, but they may
also tend to push a practice in a new direction.
Issues:
1) At what level of generality is a practice analysis most
e ective? Not for separating art in general from non-art since
the idea of art in its broadest sense is less a distinct practice
than a vast continuum of human practices, or, as Sonia Dedivy
has put it, using Wittgenstein’s analogy, “art is like a thick rope
made of many di erent intertwining bers.”[31] In Beyond Art,
Dominic Lopes has o ered a detailed argument against
continuing the quest for a de nition of the category of ( ne) art
or the ne arts as a group rather than focusing our energies on
analyzing the practices of particular arts.[32]
2) What is the explanatory scope of a practice approach without
rules? It is meant to inform but not substitute for such things as
developing an ontology of the work concept or a theory of
aesthetic judgment.[33] For a practice approach to be applicable
to individual works, it also needs to be combined with a theory
of intention or sanction along the lines suggested by Sherrie
Irvin, since individuals can chose various roles and routes.[34]
3) Can a practice approach without rules o er a principle that
will determine which elements of a practice are central or how
many such elements are needed to distinguish among art kinds?
In the practice view I am suggesting, the point is to replace talk
of xed rules or principles by the idea of a prospective identity
through the mutual accountability of performances within the
on-going history of a practice.
In closing, I want to return brie y to some curatorial claims that
got me thinking along these lines in the rst place. My guess is
that one reason Zoë Ryan and Chandler Burr insist on
“elevating” fashion or perfume into ne art is the honori c
connotations still clinging to the category of ne art or to Art
with a capital “A.” But “ ne art” is not simply a status epithet. It
also signi es a historically distinctive, if constantly changing, set
of practices in contrast to the practices of the applied and
design arts.[35] Thus, although I agree that the latter are as
important and deserving of respect as the ne arts, I believe the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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normative practices of the design arts and ne arts continue to
constitute di erent kinds of art and to that extent it is useful to
maintain a distinction between Art and Design, so long as we do
not regard it as a hierarchical relation implying superior
aesthetic and cultural value for Art over Design.
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[30] Shusterman makes his claim against Nicholas Wolterstor
and Noël Carroll in Pragmatic Aesthetics: Living Beauty,
Rethinking Art, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 43.
[31] Sonia Dedivy, “Art from a Wittensteinian Perspective,” p. 80.
[32] Dominic Lopes, Beyond Art.
[33] See Peter Lamarque, Word and Object: Explorations in the
Metaphysics of Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
[34] Sherri Irvin has pointed out an interesting interconnection
between roles and routes of institutional circulation in
contemporary art practice through her concept of the “artist’s
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-868/
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sanction,” which refers to the way artists often specify to
galleries and museums how their works should be presented,
including the role audiences should be permitted or encouraged
to play “The Artist’s Sanction in Contemporary Art,” Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63:4 (2005), 315-326.
[35] To adapt the language of Searle’s social ontology to my own
ends, the category Fine Art has lost much of its extensional
usefulness, retaining for many people only its status
implications. Yet in Western culture and even globally, ne art as
a set of practices with distinctive institutions remains.
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